Could FTX’s Assets Be Worth $114B Today? Fact-Checking SBF's Claim

Key Takeaways

SBF claims FTX’s assets could now be worth $114 billion if they hadn’t been sold.
The bankruptcy team liquidated most holdings in 2023 and 2024 to reduce risk.
Using customer funds for speculative investments was fraud from the outset.

More than three years after FTX collapsed, Sam Bankman-Fried (SBF) is still trying to rewrite the ending.

From prison, the former CEO has put forward a striking claim.

If FTX’s bankruptcy team had simply held onto its venture bets and crypto positions instead of selling them, the estate could now be worth as much as $114 billion.

It’s a headline-grabbing number—and one that taps into a familiar frustration in crypto markets: selling too early.

But behind the claim lies a more complicated story about risk, timing, and the original decisions that brought FTX down in the first place.

FTX’s $114 Billion “What If” That Won’t Go Away

SBF’s argument hinges on a simple idea: FTX’s early investments proved extraordinarily valuable, yet the bankruptcy process failed to capture that upside.

He points to a portfolio that included stakes in Anthropic, Solana, Robinhood, Genesis Digital Assets, SpaceX, and the AI coding startup Cursor.

Using current valuations, the combined total reaches roughly $114 billion.

FTX investments. — FTX investments in startups early in 2022-23. Credit: SBF on X.

The numbers, on paper, are striking.

Anthropic alone accounts for the bulk, now valued at about $82.3 billion—representing a roughly 165x return on FTX’s original investment.

SpaceX, based on updated private-market valuations, contributes an estimated $15 billion.

Solana’s recovery pushes its position to around $5.1 billion, while Robinhood and Genesis Digital add several billion more.

Even smaller bets tell the same story. Cursor, once a negligible seed investment, now carries a multi-billion-dollar valuation.

Taken together, the figures suggest enormous upside—if, and only if, those assets had been held through years of volatility.

What Actually Happened at FTX

The reality unfolded very differently.

FTX filed for Chapter 11 protection on Nov. 11, 2022, freezing customer claims at that moment in time.

The new leadership team, led by restructuring veteran John J. Ray III, faced a clear mandate: stabilize the estate, reduce risk, and return funds to creditors as quickly as possible.

That meant selling.

Major holdings were gradually liquidated throughout 2023 and 2024.

The Anthropic stake, originally around $500 million for an 8% position, was sold in two stages for a total of roughly $1.3 billion to $1.4 billion.

At the time, it represented a solid return—well before the AI boom dramatically inflated valuations.

Solana holdings followed a structured over-the-counter process.

More than 41 million locked tokens were sold in tranches, often at discounted prices to avoid disrupting the market.

During those sales, SOL traded between $20 and $60—far below today’s levels.

Other positions, including Robinhood shares, Genesis Digital Assets exposure, and smaller venture bets, were also liquidated at prevailing market prices.

By mid-2024, most of the estate’s volatile assets had been converted into cash.

The result: billions returned to creditors, with projections indicating full repayment plus interest by mid-2026.

The Problem With Hindsight

SBF’s $114 billion figure relies on a version of events where everything goes right.

Markets recover. Private valuations surge. Illiquid assets become liquid at peak prices. And, crucially, creditors are willing to wait through years of uncertainty.

That wasn’t the situation facing the bankruptcy team.

At the time of the collapse, crypto markets were still falling.

Confidence was low, regulatory pressure was high, and holding large, concentrated positions in volatile or illiquid assets posed significant risks.

A prolonged downturn could have erased much of the estate’s value.

Bankruptcy law doesn’t reward speculation. It prioritizes certainty.

Advisors are tasked with preserving value, not chasing it.

Selling early may have capped potential upside, but it also avoided the possibility of deeper losses.

In that context, the liquidation strategy followed standard practice.

FTX’s Deeper Issue

The debate over missed gains risks overlooking a more fundamental point.

The assets in question were built using customer funds that were never meant to be deployed that way.

FTX marketed itself as a platform where user deposits were secure and segregated.

In reality, billions flowed into Alameda Research and venture investments, funding high-risk bets without customer consent or transparency.

That commingling of funds became the foundation of the case against SBF.

Prosecutors argued—and a jury agreed—that he directed the misuse of customer money, leading to convictions on multiple counts of fraud and conspiracy.

In that light, the $114 billion scenario becomes less about missed opportunity and more about misplaced responsibility.

A Counterfactual That Changes Little

Today, FTX creditors are recovering more than their original account balances, largely because of the liquidation strategy SBF now criticizes.

The irony is hard to ignore.

The same sales that capped potential upside also ensured FTX repaid victims.

Without them, recoveries could have depended on unpredictable market swings and illiquid assets.

The $114 billion figure makes for a compelling narrative. It taps into the universal instinct to ask what might have been.

But it doesn’t change the underlying reality.

FTX didn’t fail because the estate sold its assets too early.

It failed because it used customer funds to make those bets in the first place.

Could FTX’s Assets Be Worth $114B Today? Fact-Checking SBF’s Claim