DeFi Faces Crisis After Lazarus Infiltration Claims—KelpDAO Hack May Be Just the Beginning
Key Takeaways
Arbitrum’s Security Council has frozen approximately 30,766 ETH, valued at around $100 million, directly tied to the recent KelpDAO exploit.
The action, executed on Apr. 20, marks one of the largest on-chain freezes by a major Layer 2 network in response to a DeFi hack.
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A day after one of the largest DeFi exploits (worth nearly $300 million) on KelpDAO, Arbitrum moved quickly to freeze a significant portion of the stolen funds routed through its network.
According to on-chain data and Arbitrum’s official statement, the funds were initially held in a hacker-controlled address before the Security Council transferred them to a secure intermediary wallet.
This wallet is now inaccessible to the original address, effectively locking the funds pending further governance approval.
Crucially, the intervention caused no disruption to Arbitrum users, applications, or the broader network.
No legitimate transactions were affected, and the chain’s state remained unchanged outside the targeted address.
The freeze focused solely on exploit-linked funds, highlighting Arbitrum’s ability to act precisely in high-stakes situations.
“The Arbitrum Security Council has taken emergency action to freeze the 30,766 ETH held at the address on Arbitrum One linked to the KelpDAO exploit. The Security Council acted with input from law enforcement regarding the exploiter’s identity and, at all times, weighed its commitment to the security and integrity of the Arbitrum community without impacting any Arbitrum users or applications.”
At the time, this portion was the largest confirmed share of stolen funds on Arbitrum, with the rest primarily remaining on Ethereum mainnet.
Arbitrum operates as a DAO-governed Layer 2, where decisions are typically made through token-holder voting.
However, in urgent situations, the network relies on its Security Council—a delegated body with limited emergency powers—to act quickly.
In this case, the council intervened after what Arbitrum described as “significant technical diligence and deliberation.”
The team identified the exploiter’s address and confirmed its link to the KelpDAO hack.
They also coordinated with law enforcement to assess the attacker, who they widely suspect to be the Lazarus Group.
Only then did the council execute the transfer to secure the funds without affecting the broader network.
Importantly, this was not a permanent or unilateral action. The Security Council’s role is to contain immediate risk, not determine final outcomes.
Any movement of the frozen ETH now requires a full Arbitrum DAO vote.
While some critics argue that such intervention challenges decentralization, others see it as a necessary safeguard.
Arbitrum’s model, combining emergency action with subsequent DAO oversight, aims to balance speed with accountability.
The exploit began on Apr. 18, when attackers targeted KelpDAO’s LayerZero-powered rsETH bridge.
Attackers drained roughly 116,500 rsETH (about 18% of the supply) in a sophisticated cross-chain exploit, with total losses estimated at around $292 million.
The attackers, whose wallets were pre-funded via Tornado Cash, submitted a fraudulent LayerZero message (nonce 308) to the bridge’s OFT adapter.
This tricked the contract into releasing real rsETH without a corresponding burn on the source chain.
Within minutes, the attackers funneled the stolen tokens into lending protocols like Aave.
Hackers then used the stolen funds as collateral to borrow over $236 million in WETH and other assets.
The attacker then converted portions into ETH and routed funds across chains—roughly $178 million on Ethereum mainnet and about $100 million onto Arbitrum.
Phil Fogel, Co-Founder of Cork, told CCN:
“The Kelp DAO/LayerZero is a stark reminder that risk in DeFi exists at every layer, and it is an example that we operate daily as if it doesn’t. Liquidity risk. Depeg risk on rsETH and other LRTs. Bad debt was priced by no one upfront, and no one knew how to absorb it.”
Fogel added that when markets froze, illiquidity left users unable to exit positions, effectively trapping losses.
“The market had no clearing mechanism, just a rate cap on Aave and big depositors with agents that got out first, leaving everyone else to pay the price. That’s not equal access. That’s not a truly functioning market.”
A second malicious transaction targeting another ~40,000 rsETH (worth about $100 million) was already in progress but failed after KelpDAO activated its emergency “pauseAll” function within 46 minutes of the initial attack.