Key Takeaways
A new draft proposal from Bitcoin developers has placed the protocol’s early history under renewed examination. The draft suggests invalidating coins stored in quantum-vulnerable addresses, including those assumed to belong to Satoshi Nakamoto, before advancements in cryptography threaten Bitcoin’s security model.
In this article, the motivations behind the proposal, its technical mechanics, recent wallet activity, and broader implications for the network’s future are detailed.
The proposal, titled “Post-Quantum Migration and Legacy Signature Sunset,” was published on GitHub on July 14 and highlights the importance of taking proactive security measures. Among those are pay-to-public-key (P2PK) addresses from Bitcoin’s early years.
These wallet formats reveal public keys directly, making them more susceptible to being compromised if a sufficiently powerful quantum computer emerges. An estimated 1.1 million BTC remain stored in such addresses, many believed to be linked to Satoshi Nakamoto.
That said, approximately 25% of Bitcoin’s supply (nearly 4–5 million BTC) is stored in addresses that have revealed their public keys on-chain, making them theoretically vulnerable to quantum attacks.
Security researchers behind the proposal argue that while current hardware cannot break Bitcoin’s digital signatures, analysts observed movement of several long-dormant wallets, raising concern around whether holders are preemptively migrating funds in response to quantum readiness discussions.
A May 2025 paper indicated that quantum computers may require far fewer resources than previously thought to break RSA encryption.
Though Bitcoin uses elliptic curve cryptography, researchers warn that advances in quantum computing could pose a similar threat within the next few years.
To prepare for potential quantum attacks, Bitcoin developers, including Casa CTO Jameson Lopp, have proposed a phased soft fork that gradually transitions the network away from cryptographically outdated address formats. This approach is meant to nudge users toward quantum-resistant formats like P2QRH, part of BIP‑360.

While controversial, the phased rollout gives users time to adapt and raises the question of how far Bitcoin should go to secure its future.
Concerns around quantum risk intensified following a notable event in July 2025. Eight dormant wallets from the early mining era moved a total of $8.5 billion in Bitcoin. These addresses had not been active for over 15 years, leading to speculation about whether early holders wereare preparing to transfer coins into more secure wallets.
Although no connection has been confirmed between this movement and the draft proposal, the timing has elevated public interest in quantum security.
Approximately 25% of the current Bitcoin supply resides in addresses with exposed public keys, meaning they’re vulnerable to a ‘Q‑day‘ style attack.
These UTXOs can theoretically be targeted in the event of a successful quantum attack because blockchain data is publicly accessible to an attacker who could use a powerful quantum machine to derive private keys from known public keys without triggering alerts.
This slow-drain scenario has been described in the draft as a “bleed,” a model in which coins are quietly extracted over weeks or months, avoiding immediate detection by chain surveillance systems.
The push to address quantum threats has revived one of Bitcoin’s longest-standing taboos:
Such a step, if implemented, would represent a shift in how the network views its own founding principles, placing security ahead of untouchability.
For this proposal to become active, a sufficient portion of the network must voluntarily adopt the upgraded software.
Bitcoin operates through decentralized consensus, meaning miners, node operators and users must align in running the new code. Without broad agreement, any such fork would likely be ignored by the dominant chain.
As of July 30, 2025, the proposal has no formal Bitcoin Improvement Proposal (BIP) number. It remains in draft form and is under review by core developers and other contributors.
No timeline for activation has been established.
The proposal has reignited deeper questions about where Bitcoin draws the line between protection and principle:
Freezing Satoshi’s untouched coins, long seen as a symbol of selfless intent and decentralization, risks appearing ungrateful to the founder’s legacy and may be perceived as a rejection of the voluntary ethos on which Bitcoin was built.
Critics warn that bending protocol neutrality, even for security, risks turning Bitcoin into what it was built to resist.
The proposed soft fork to phase out quantum-vulnerable addresses has sparked debate. It promises stronger long-term security but also raises concerns about precedent and network principles.
| Aspect | Positive impact | Potential concern |
| Security | Stronger defense against future quantum attacks | Risk of premature action before quantum threat is proven |
| User funds | Encourages migration to secure addresses | Dormant coins may be permanently locked |
| Governance | Shows adaptability of Bitcoin protocol | Challenges immutability and decentralization norms |
| Market perception | Seen as proactive and future-proofing | Could create fear or uncertainty among investors |
As learned, the above technical debate has reaffirmed that Bitcoin governance does not bend to wealth.
While fears focus on coins being stolen via quantum breakthroughs, others point out a paradox:
In this light, the threat itself becomes part of Bitcoin’s ongoing story, not its undoing, but its next challenge to be addressed.
Whether the proposal gains traction or not, the discussion reflects growing concern over quantum readiness.
Some view this draft as an initial framework for dealing with what may eventually become an unavoidable transition. Others argue that no change should be made until quantum attacks have been observed or proven functional in the wild.
As of now, the draft proposal has not been adopted and remains under consideration. Its impact may not be measured solely by implementation, but by how it shifts the broader conversation around security, decentralization, and the management of legacy risks in Bitcoin.
P2PK (Pay-to-Public-Key) exposes public keys on-chain, unlike modern formats like P2PKH and P2WPKH, which reveal them only upon spending, offering better quantum resistance. While not implemented yet, proposals like P2QRH are under discussion to future-proof Bitcoin’s signature schemes against quantum threats. Yes. Projects like QANplatform and Mina Protocol have explored or implemented quantum-resistant components, though no solution is battle-tested yet. Yes. Centralized entities holding large sums are soft targets; quantum attackers may first aim at exchanges or custodians before attempting on-chain exploits.