Key Takeaways
On May 25, 2025, Google officially announced in a research blog a 20-fold reduction in the quantum computing resources required to factor Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA) encryption, a public-key cryptosystem widely used for secure data transmission.
While Bitcoin does not use RSA, the breakthrough has intensified scrutiny of elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), which secures Bitcoin’s digital signature mechanism.
A team led by Craig Gidney, a quantum researcher and engineer at Google Quantum AI, demonstrated a refined approach that reduces the number of qubits needed to attack RSA-2048. Though the research targets RSA specifically, it raises concern about whether ECC-based systems, like Bitcoin’s, can resist future advances in quantum computing.
This development raises concerns about whether a sufficiently advanced quantum computer could derive Bitcoin private keys from exposed public ones, potentially compromising stored funds and undermining trust in the network’s cryptographic security.
Bitcoin’s network uses elliptic curve cryptography to secure wallets and verify transactions. The system relies on the secp256k1 curve to generate public and private keys, which are mathematically linked but extremely difficult to reverse without the original input.
Unlike RSA, which underpins many older systems, elliptic curve methods achieve comparable security with much shorter keys. This efficiency made ECC the preferred choice for Bitcoin from inception. Both RSA and ECC rely on problems that are difficult for classical computers but vulnerable to quantum algorithms like Shor’s.
Until recently, most estimates placed the quantum threat to ECC far into the future. Google’s 2025 research update challenges that timeline, showing that far fewer qubits may be required to mount a practical attack than previously believed.
Historical estimates of the number of physical qubits needed to factor 2048-bit RSA integers.
Quantum computing introduces new concerns for how Bitcoin keys are exposed and stored. Some addresses carry more risk than others, depending on how and when they reveal key data.
Key risks include:
While the technology to exploit these weaknesses does not yet exist, the timeline shift shown by recent research, from Google directly, makes early planning more relevant than before.
Efforts to prepare Bitcoin for a potential quantum threat focus on developing and adopting encryption methods that can resist both classical and quantum attacks.
PQC development is advancing, but applying it to Bitcoin will demand coordination, compatibility, and time. For instance, governance hurdles may emerge given changes required to Bitcoin’s core cryptography would require broad support across miners, nodes, and wallet providers. Opt-in upgrades are more likely than forced transitions.
BIP360 is a proposal by Hunter Beast aimed at protecting Bitcoin from future quantum attacks. The main goal is to add quantum-resistant addresses to the Bitcoin network so that if quantum computers become strong enough to break today’s cryptography, funds will remain safe.
Here’s what the proposal introduces:
The goal is to give users and developers time to shift toward safer options before the risk becomes real. This proposal doesn’t change how Bitcoin works overnight, but it opens the door for a smoother transition.
Exchanges, custodians, and asset managers have begun conducting internal reviews of cryptographic exposure. Several institutions are evaluating hybrid wallet models that support both ECC and PQC key structures, though few have released production-ready solutions.
Custodial providers in jurisdictions with digital asset regulations are also monitoring NIST and ISO standardization developments. These national institutes and organizations are leading efforts to formalize post-quantum cryptographic algorithms for global use, guiding how future encryption methods will be evaluated and adopted.
Compliance frameworks may eventually require post-quantum assurances for long-term custody solutions.
Insurers underwriting digital asset coverage have also flagged quantum threat models as a future policy consideration, especially for large reserves held under visible key schemes.
To keep your Bitcoin safe, it’s important to adopt smart security habits that fit real-world use.
Google’s 2025 quantum computing update has challenged previous assumptions about the security of ECC-based systems like Bitcoin. While current hardware does not pose an immediate threat, the shrinking timeline has increased urgency around reviewing protocols and planning for quantum-safe cryptography.
Quantum-resistant alternatives exist in theory and early-stage implementation, but integrating them into Bitcoin will require widespread coordination, hardware compatibility, and policy consensus across the ecosystem. Without proactive action, addresses exposing public keys and lacking strong security measures may face growing risks in the coming decade.
Estimates vary, but likely in 1,500–2,500 logical qubits with low error rates. Yes, Ethereum is also potentially at risk from quantum attacks because it uses similar cryptographic algorithms (like elliptic curve cryptography) that could be vulnerable once large-scale quantum computers become practical. No, quantum computers cannot counterfeit Bitcoin or create new coins out of thin air; Bitcoin’s consensus rules and blockchain validation prevent unauthorized coin creation regardless of computing power.How many qubits would a quantum computer need to break Bitcoin keys?
Is Ethereum also at risk from quantum attacks?
Could quantum computers counterfeit Bitcoin or mint new coins?