Key Takeaways
Crypto adoption is moving fast. Faster than regulators, faster than most businesses, and certainly faster than security teams can keep up. However, this comes with a cost: attacks follow right behind.
In June 2024, Lykke, a small UK exchange, was breached. Hackers stole $19.5 million (and up to $23 million due to volatility) in digital assets, roughly £17 million at the time. For Lykke, the blow was fatal. Investors were wiped out. The company collapsed not long after.
The trail did not stop at the exchange. Investigators followed it further and the UK Treasury’s Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) found a familiar name: Lazarus Group, North Korea’s notorious hacking unit.

The same crew linked to bank heists, ransomware, and earlier crypto raids. This time, their work destroyed a business. And it wasn’t just about money anymore. It became a matter of international security.
Regulators treated the case differently and courts did too. For the first time, a crypto hack by a state-backed team forced governments to face a bigger problem: what happens when nation-states use crypto crime as a weapon?
This article explains the story and its implications.
The breach first happened on June 4, 2024. Unusual activity was detected inside Lykke’s systems, as reported by SomaXBT.

However, the damage was already done when this was noticed, and millions in assets had been drained.
Lykke tried to respond quickly. The frozen withdrawals and the company announced new cybersecurity checks. But confidence had already collapsed.
+76
Users were uneasy, and the exchange’s long-standing lack of transparency did not help. Lykke had not published financial statements since 2020, leaving many wondering what was happening behind the scenes.
The final blow came months later. On December 6, 2024, the exchange collapsed. This event triggered a series of legal and financial consequences.
In January 2025, founder Richard Olsen filed for personal bankruptcy.
By March 26, 2025, a UK court ordered Lykke into liquidation, formally marking the end of the exchange.
In August 2025, the OFSI officially linked the hack to North Korean cyber actors, specifically the Lazarus Group.

Lazarous group operates under North Korea’s intelligence bureau and has one clear goal: raise funds for the country’s nuclear and missile programs.
To do this, they have turned crypto theft into a revenue stream using methods including rapid money laundering via no know your customer (KYC) platforms.
Chainalysis has tracked billions stolen through their operations, making them one of the most dangerous state-backed cyber units in the world.
Lykke’s downfall shines a light on the dangers small crypto exchanges might face:


Lykke’s story is about a failed exchange and the risks of cutting corners on security and compliance. Other small platforms may face the same fate without stronger defenses, mandatory audits, and proper licensing.
Recovering from Lykke’s hack looks uncertain. Interpath Advisory controls about $68 million in assets, but full repayment for users is unlikely.
Creditors have formed groups, pursuing class actions with Baker McKenzie.
At the same time, Match Systems traces stolen funds, though much has already vanished into hidden wallets.
Founder Richard Olsen, “the crypto grandpa,” said he would compensate customers, but those claims now seem doubtful.
The hack delivers clear lessons. Exchanges must adopt multi-party computation (MPC) wallets, which split a private key into multiple encrypted parts, while also running audits and securing cyber insurance.
Users should rely on hardware wallets, 2FA, and self-custody, reinforcing the old warning: “not your keys, not your crypto.”
Lykke was a UK-registered company, but it also operated from Switzerland’s “crypto valley” in Zug.
As a result, in 2025, the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA) and the FCA introduced more rigid rules, pressing firms toward stronger compliance.
At the same time, decentralized finance (DeFi) platforms gained ground as more users shifted away from centralized exchanges (CEXs).
The Lykke hack is only part of a bigger and more troubling picture. In July 2025, Google sent an urgent alert to more than 2 billion Gmail users about a large-scale phishing campaign. Reports linked the activity to North Korean state-backed hackers, with some experts pointing to the Lazarus Group.
These attacks relied on fake login pages and spoofed emails to steal credentials. The threat now stretches far beyond crypto.

Small platforms are easy targets, but even tech giants like Google are raising alarms. The harsh truth is clear: state-backed cybercrime is not just about stolen coins; it threatens the entire online world.
The Lykke hack exposed how fragile smaller crypto exchanges remain in the face of advanced cybercrime. A $23 million breach forced the platform into liquidation and left creditors scrambling, setting a UK legal first. Investigations linked the attack to North Korea’s Lazarus Group, showing how stolen crypto fuels global threats.
For users, the case proves once again that weak security, no audits, and lack of insurance can be fatal. Centralized exchanges without strong protections will continue to be prime targets, while regulators now demand tougher compliance and oversight.
The lessons are clear: firms must build stronger defenses, adopt tools like MPC wallets, and maintain transparency. Users should not depend on promises but instead take control of their assets with hardware wallets and self-custody. Lykke’s collapse is a warning, not just for exchanges, but for the broader digital economy.
Over 70 creditors filed £5.7M in claims; Interpath Advisory manages ~$68M, but full repayment is unlikely. Olsen pledged repayment through “other projects,” but no proof followed. He was declared bankrupt in January 2025. Lykke gave up a limited license in 2022 and never secured a full one due to liquidity issues and compliance failures. The absence of cyber insurance left losses uncovered, pushing Lykke toward insolvency after the hack.